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Individualism vs. Group Rights:
The Legacy of Brown*
William Bradford Reynolds t
There is, I believe, no higher or more important calling than the com-
mitment to education, for to our teachers we entrust the awesome respon-
siblity of developing America's most precious resource-the minds of our
youth. Only if the limits of man's knowledge and understanding are
broadened, and the lessons of history learned, will tomorrow's leaders be
prepared to detect and correct our errors-in much the same manner that
we, gathered here today, strive to identify and profit from the mistakes of
our forebears.
On another level, the privilege of education is basic to the full exercise
of fundamental constitutional rights. For example, the precious First
Amendment right to trade in the "marketplace of ideas" undeniably has
less value to those who are educationally ill-equipped to participate fully
in the exchange. Similarly, all would concede that education is essential to
informed participation in the affairs of government through the right to
vote.
Yet, despite the critical importance to all Americans-and to Amer-
ica-of quality education, the decline in educational achievement among
our youth has emerged as one of the Nation's most pressing contemporary
social issues. Note that I have deliberately refrained from characterizing
the issue as one of civil rights-notwithstanding the popular inclination in
many quarters, particularly in the courts, to speak of social policy issues
as though they are, in essence, civil rights issues. Indeed, there, I submit,
lies one of our most fundamental problems today. The contemporary ex-
pansion of the traditional concept of civil rights to include a broad array
of purely social concerns has failed, in my view, to solve-and has often
exacerbated-those very social concerns the expansion was intended to
serve while, at the same time, leading in too many instances to an erosion
of individual civil rights protections under the Constitution and the
landmark legislation of the early 1960's, at least as those measures are
traditionally and properly understood.
* This essay was originally delivered as a speech before the Lincoln Institute Conference on Sep-
tember 28, 1983.
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What, you might ask, is the traditional and proper understanding of
"civil rights"? Let me, in response, defer to Professor Chester Finn of
Vanderbilt University, who observed, in recent testimony before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, that:
[C]ivil rights-fundamentally the rights of citizenship, of a member
of the polity, . . .- inhere in individuals, not in groups. While dis-
crimination against an individual, or the denial of rights to an indi-
vidual, may occur because the individual has some of the characteris-
tics of a particular group-such as gender, color, religion, etc.,-the
inalienable rights themselves inhere in the individual, and any
abridgement of them is an act of discrimination against the individ-
ual. That is a fundamental principle of democracy. It is explicit in
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution (perhaps espe-
cially in the Bill of Rights) and in the major civil rights legislation
over the decades. To be sure, there have been all too many occasions
in our history where acts of discrimination were perpetrated against
many or all of the individuals in a particular group, but it is none-
theless the individuals who were discriminated against.'
There are those who, rather unabashedly, have undertaken to redefine
this traditional concept of civil rights. The essential concern for individual
opportunity, so correctly underscored by Professor Finn, has been sub-
merged by this school of thought beneath a rising tide of group entitle-
ments. The Civil Rights Commission, to cite but one example, has in re-
cent years been in the forefront of this movement-endorsing, in many of
its reports and pronouncements, approaches geared to group improve-
ments at the expense of individual initiative. To me-as to many
others-such an approach reflects a fundamental distortion of civil rights
in a democratic society, and I would like to spend a few pages sharing
some thoughts on this subject in the hope that they will foster a better
understanding and appreciation for Administration policy in the sensitive
and critically important area of civil rights.
Let me start with the interesting observation that many of those who
over the past decade have sought fervently to propel civil rights enforce-
ment along a group-oriented course are the same men and women who
were in the vanguard of the great civil rights movement of the 1950's and
1960's-the movement that, for the first time, put individual rights on the
pedestal reserved for them by the Founders of this great country and the
Framers of our Constitution. To be sure, the "distancing," if you will,
1. A Bill to Amend the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to Extend the Life of the Comnission on Civil
Rights, and for Other Purposes, 1983: Hearings on S. 1189 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) (statement of Chester E. Finn,
Jr., Professor of Education and Public Policy, Vanderbilt University).
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from the traditional concept of civil rights by some of the original advo-
cates has been gradual, but clearly discernible. A quick look at that evolu-
tionary process is a useful framework to the discussion that follows, par-
ticularly here, since the field of education has provided the catalyst for
much of the reoriented thinking. While the focus of my remarks will be
on race discrimination, what follows applies with equal force to discrimi-
nation on account of sex, ethnic origin, and religion.
America's first enduring step towards securing the civil right to nondis-
criminatory treatment was, of course, passage of the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which abolished slavery, guaranteed
to all citizens equal protection under the law, and protected the right to
vote from racial discrimination. History faithfully records that the purpose
of these Amendments was to end forever a system which determined legal
rights, measured status, and allocated opportunities on the basis of race,
and to erect in its place a regime of race neutrality. Thus, in the 1866
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection clause was
described as "abolish[ing] all class legislation in the States [so as to do]
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another."
'2
Thirty years later, in 1896, a Supreme Court Justice, the elder Justice
Harlan, correctly recognized that these Civil Rights Amendments had "re-
moved the race line from our governmental systems." 3 In Plessy v. Fergu-
son, he declared: "Our Constitution is colorblind and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens . . . .The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color . . .-
Unfortunately, as we all know, his was a lone dissenting voice in that
case. A majority of the Supreme Court turned back the clock on civil
rights, holding that racial distinctions were permitted under the Four-
teenth Amendment. The separate-but-equal doctrine formulated by the
Plessy majority held sway in America for over half a century, a period in
which many state and local governments regulated the enjoyment of virtu-
ally every public benefit-from attendance in public schools to the use of
public restrooms-on the basis of race. It was not until 1954 that the
patent injustice of governmental allocation of benefits along racial lines
ultimately-indeed inevitably-brought the Supreme Court to its finest
hour: the case of Brown v. Board of Education.5
In Brown, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest the separate-but-equal
doctrine. The Court acknowledged with eloquent simplicity that the equal
2. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896).
4. Id. at 559.
5. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). /
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protection clause requires governmental race neutrality in all public activ-
ities. "At stake," declared Chief Justice Warren for a unanimous Court,
"is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools
. . . on a [racially] nondiscriminatory basis."' Race consciousness as a
tool for assigning school children was flatly and unequivocally condemned,
and the personal right-the civil right-to nondiscrimination was
vindicated. /
This judicial insistence on colorblindness in our public school systems
was precisely the conclusion urged by the school children's attorney,
Thurgood Marshall. Expressly rejecting the notion that the Constitution
would require the establishment of "non-segregated school[s]" through
race-conscious student reassignments, Mr. Marshall argued to the Court
that:
The only thing that we ask for is that the State-imposed racial segre-
gation be taken off, and to leave the county school board, the county
people, the district people, to work out their own solution of the
problem, to assign children on any reasonable basis they want to
assign them on.'
So long as the children were assigned "without regard to race or color,
. . . nobody," argued Mr. Marshall, "would have any complaint." 8
Thus, both Court and counsel recognized that the civil right at is-
sue-the right to race-neutral assignment-belonged to each individual
student and therefore could not be reconciled with the group-oriented no-
tion that the Constitution requires integration through race-conscious stu-
dent assignments.
The Brown decision spurred a judicial and legislative drive to eliminate
racial discrimination in virtually every aspect of American life. Nearly
two centuries after the Declaration of Independence recognized the con-
cept of equality as a "self-evident" truth," the principle was finally being
written into law. Out of the turmoil, bitter debate, and strife of the 1950's
there began to emerge in the 1960's a broad recognition-a consen-
sus-that official colorblindness and equal opportunity for all individuals
were not just legal commandments, but moral imperatives, that could no
longer be denied.
None was more passionately committed to the colorblind principle of
equal opportunity for each individual than the leaders of the civil rights
6. Id. at 300.
7. Reprinted in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at 47 (L. Friedman ed. 1969).
8. Id. at 48.
9. Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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movement, who had for so many years courageously marched in bold defi-
ance of those bent on ordering society according to the color of a person's
skin. Preferential treatment based on race was intolerable to them, regard-
less of the purpose. Roy Wilkins, while he was Executive Director of the
NAACP, stated the position unabashedly during congressional considera-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
Our association has never been in favor of the quota system.
We believe the quota system is unfair whether it is used for
[blacks] or against [blacks] . . . . [W]e feel people ought to be hired
because of their ability, irrespective of their color . . . . We want
equality, equality of opportunity and employment on the basis of
ability.1 0
Similarly, Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal De-
fense Fund, in urging the Supreme Court to invalidate a state statute re-
quiring that a candidate's race be designated on each ballot, argued:
[T]he fact that this statute might operate to benefit a [black] candi-
date and against a white candidate . . . is not relevant. For, it is
submitted that the State has a duty under the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment to be "color-blind" and not to act so
as to encourage racial discrimination. . . against any racial group."1
The Court agreed and struck down the offending statute.
The principle of race neutrality was fully endorsed as well by the Con-
gress of the United States with passage of a series of important new laws
designed to make equal opportunity a reality: the Civil Rights Acts of
1957, 1960, and 1964, the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, and the Fair
Housing Act of 1968. That Congress intended these enactments to estab-
lish a standard blind to color distinctions is reflected in both the statutes'
language and their legislative histories. For example, Senator Humphrey,
the principal force behind passage of the 1964 Act in the Senate, repeat-
edly stated that Title VII would prohibit any consideration of race in em-
ployment matters, using on one occasion these words:
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in em-
ployment shall be given to Negroes or to any other persons or
groups. It does not provide that any quota systems may be estab-
10. Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdition of the
United States, 1963: Hearings on H.R. 7152 before Subcomn. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiia,, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2144 (statement of Roy Wilkens).
11. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants, at 11-12, Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964)
(emphasis added).
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lished to maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the title
would prohibit preferential treatment for any particular group, and
any person, whether or not a member of any minority group, would
be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment
practices.
12
Similarly, in the area of school desegregation, the 1964 Congress took
special precautions to ensure that Title IV of the same Act was equally
faithful to the principle of race neutrality. This was reflected in two sepa-
rate sections of the legislation: one that plainly states "'desegregation'
shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to
overcome racial imbalance,""3 and another that stresses even more explic-
itly that the Act does not "empower any official or court of the United
States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance . ... " Nor
did Congress rest there. The 1974 Equal Educational Opportunities Act 5
includes congressional findings regarding the counterproductive nature of
excessive busing to achieve classroom ratios based on race, places limita-
tions on the authority of courts to order such relief, and expresses a strong
preference for other remedies-such as neighborhood schools with neu-
trally drawn zones, transfer programs, magnet schools, and new construc-
tion-which better combine the objectives of desegregation and educa-
tional improvement. 6 And this congressional attitude was reaffirmed in
the last Congress, when both houses voted overwhelmingly against utiliza-
tion of the tool of "forced busing" to achieve school desegregation.
These judicial and legislative pronouncements reflect a national consen-
sus that racial classifications are wrong-morally wrong-and ought not
to be tolerated in any form or for any reason. Spokesmen both within and
outside of government have advanced the principle, but its true essence
was best captured, in my judgment, by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
when he dreamed aloud in the summer of 1963 of a nation in which his
12. 110 CONG. REC. 11,848 (1964).
13. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 401(b), 78 Stat. 241, 246 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b)
(1976)).
14. Id. § 407(a), 78 Stat. at 248 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976)).
15. Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 201-259, 88 Stat. 484, 514-21 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758
(1982)).
16. Id. § 203, 88 Stat. at 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1702 (1982)); id. § 215, 88 Stat. at 517
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1714 (1982)); id. § 214, 88 Stat. at 517 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1713
(1982)).
17. Both Houses of the 97th Congress amended Department of Justice authorization bills to in-
clude anti-busing provisions. See H.R. 3462, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2787-2805
(daily ed. June 9, 1981); S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S1317-36 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1982). Because the two Houses did not agree on the form of the entire authorization bill, however, the
amendment did not become law.
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children would "not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the con-
tent of their character.""8
In the 1970's, however, as I indicated at the outset, the quest for equal-
ity of opportunity for individuals began in some quarters gradually to
evolve into an insistence upon equality of results for groups. The
individual-oriented concept of racial neutrality was blurred into the
group-oriented concept of racial balance, on the representation that the
former could not be fully realized unless the latter was achieved.
Numerical proportionality among groups became for some a civil right.
Regulation and allocation of individuals by race, they argued, are not
wrong per se. Rather, their validity depends upon who is being regulated,
what is being allocdted, and the purpose of the arrangement. If a racial
preference will achieve the desired statistical result, its discriminatory fea-
ture can be tolerated, w are told, as an unfortunate but necessary conse-
quence of remedying the effects of past discrimination-using race "in
order to get beyond racism" is the way one member of the Supreme Court
has put it.19
The analytical flaw in this approach was laid bare by Professor Alex-
ander Bickel in his extraordinary book, The Morality of Consent.20 In
precise terms, he responded to such reasoning in the following manner:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the
lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a gen-
eration: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, un-
constitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic soci-
ety. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a
matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is
gored . . . . Having found support in the Constitution for equality,
[proponents of group-oriented racial preferences] now claim support
for inequality under the same Constitution.21
Another champion of equal opportunity and individual liberty, Justice
William 0. Douglas, was no less adamant in his rejection of group-
oriented, race-conscious solutions. In 1974, in connection with the first
case to come before the Supreme Court involving the allegedly benign use
of race to allocate among racial groups the limited number of places in a
professional school, Justice Douglas stated: "The Equal Protection Clause
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order to
18. C. KING, My LIFE wrrIH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 239 (1969) (quoting address by Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., Aug. 28, 1963).
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
21. Id. at 133.
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satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized . *.".., None-
theless, the lesson of history was ignored, and during the 1970's, the use
of racial classifications became a commonplace method of satisfying an
emerging, group-oriented theory as to how society ought to be organized.
In the area of public education, the predominant court-ordered relief for
denials of the right upheld in Brown-that is, the right to student assign-
ments on a racially non-discriminatory basis-became mandatory race-
conscious student assignments, often entailing long, involuntary bus rides
to schools far from the student's home. The social issue of racial balance
in the classroom-rather than the civil rights issue of racial neutrality in
student assignments-became the overriding concern in school desegrega-
tion decrees, and the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in Swann that
race-conscious assignments and mandatory student transportation are le-
gitimate desegregation techniques2" evolved into nothing short of a judicial
obsession with forced busing to achieve racial balance.
Rather than achieving racial balance, however, this preoccupation with
mandatory busing has generally produced racial isolation on a broader
scale. In case after case, economically able parents have refused to permit
their children to travel unnecessary distances to attend public schools,
choosing instead to enroll them in private schools or to move beyond reach
of the desegregation decree. Justice Powell has commented on this phe-
nomenon in the following terms:
This pursuit of racial balance at any cost . . . is without constitu-
tional or social justification. Out of zeal to remedy one evil, courts
may encourage or set the stage for other evils. By acting against one-
race schools, courts may produce one-race school systems.24
After more than a decade of court-ordered busing, the evidence is over-
whelming that the effort to desegregate through wholesale reliance on
race-conscious student assignment plans has failed. The damage to public
education wrought by mandatory busing is evident in city after city: Bos-
ton, Cleveland, Detroit, Wilmington, Memphis, Denver, and Los Angeles
are but a few of the larger and thus more celebrated examples. Nor is it
difficult to understand why. The flight from urban public schools contrib-
utes to the erosion of the municipal tax base, which in turn has a direct
bearing on the growing inability of many school systems to provide a
quality public education to their students-whether black or white. Simi-
22. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342-44 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
23. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 450 (1980) (Powell, J.,
joined by Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted).
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larly, the loss of parental support and involvement-which often comes
with the abandonment of a neighborhood schools policy-has robbed
many public school systems of a critical component of successful educa-
tional programs.
Mandatory busing is an excellent example of the contemporary inclina-
tion to view a group-oriented social problem-racial stratification in pub-
lic schools-as a civil rights issue and to seek to solve it with coercive
judicial remedies. In the process, the social problem is generally worsened,
and the real civil right-the individual student's right to be free from
racial discrimination in assignment-is invariably sacrificed.
Indeed, the more insistent government is on the use of racial prefer-
ences-whether in the form of quotas, goals, or any other numerical de-
vice-to correct what is perceived as an "imbalance" in our schools, our
neighborhoods, our work places, or our elected bodies, the more racially
polarized society becomes. Such a selection process inevitably encourages
us to stereotype our fellow human beings-to view their advancements,
not as hard-won achievements, but as conferred benefits. It invites us to
look upon people as possessors of racial characteristics, not as the unique
individuals who they are. It submerges the vitality of personality under
the deadening prejudgments of race. The very purpose intended to be
served is defeated, for race-based preferences cut against the grain of
equal opportunity. And, while we are told repeatedly that this is tempora-
rily necessary in the interest of achieving "equal results" among groups,
let us not forget that it was the same justification (i.e., achieving "equal
results") that sustained for over half a century the separate-but-equal doc-
trine-which likewise looked to membership in a particular racial group
as an accepted basis for according individuals different treatment.
That sobering thought-the thought that we could by 1996 have come
full circle-provides a ready answer to those who argue that we must use
race to get beyond racism. History teaches us all too well that such an
approach does not work. It is wrong when the government bestows advan-
tages on whites at the expense of innocent blacks; it assumes no greater
claim of morality if the tables are turned. More discrimination is simply
not the way to end discrimination. We are all-each of us-a minority in
this country: a minority of one. Our rights derive from the uniquely
American belief in the primacy of the individual. And in no instance
should an individual's rights rise any higher or fall any lower than the
rights of others because of race, gender, or ethnic origin. Whatever group
membership one inherits, it carries with it no entitlement to preferential
treatment over those not similarly endowed with the same immutable
characteristics. Any compromise of this principle is discrimination, plain
and simple, and such behavior is no more tolerable when employed reme-
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dially, in the name of "affirmative action" or "racial balance," to bestow a
gratuitous advantage on members of a particular group, than when it is
divorced from such beneficence and for the most invidious of reasons
works to one's disadvantage. Nor can any such compromise long endure.
As Jack Greenberg put it in a law review article published in 1959, the
inconsistency between "the personal right of freedom from racial discrimi-
nation" and "a group right philosophy" is "like a foreign body in the
human system; there is a normal, instinctive reaction to force it out."
'2 5
To be sure, there are significant benefits our citizens obtain from at-
tending a culturally diverse school and laboring in a multi-racial
workforce. But to recognize the legitimacy of these benefits is not to justify
or support racial quotas in hiring, firing, and promotions, nor to tolerate
school assignments by race to achieve racial percentages.
Rather, the only sensible policy course is to expand recruitment, to
reach out and include those minorities who were previously excluded, and
then to judge all applicants on their individual merits, without discrimina-
tion. In education, the policy must be to expand educational opportunities
with special magnet schools and other curriculum-improvement programs,
and then to allow all children to attend these or other schools within the
system regardless of race or residence. As Dr. Dennis L. Cuddy has noted
repeatedly, with this voluntary approach, the callous injustice of racial
discrimination can be cured-not by imposing burdens on innocent indi-
viduals because of color, but by reaching out to all individuals and ex-
tending them a full measure of opportunity and consideration based on
merit.26
We are, I submit, at a crossroads in the development of civil rights
policy in this country. We can adhere to the fundamental principles that
got us this far and fight-as did the leaders of the civil rights movement in
the 1960's-for the rights of individuals, or we can continue the drift in
the direction of race-conscious decisionmaking, elevating the interests of
particular groups above the rights-the civil rights-of their members. It
is my firm belief that Professor William Van Alstyne pointed in the right
direction:
[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete,
resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own
life-or in the life or practices of one's government-the differential
treatment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that is the great
lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in life, whatever
25. Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interests in the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 503, 507
(1959).
26. Cuddy, A Proposal to Achieve Desegregation Through Free Choice, AM. EDuc., May 1983,
25-31.
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we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or to favor
any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is
wrong. Let that be our fundamental law and we shall have a Consti-
tution universally worth expounding."'
If we follow that sound advice, the evil of discrimination that has
plagued us for so many years can indeed begin to be discussed largely as a
problem of the past, rather than as a "brooding omnipresence" that con-
tinues to haunt us for the future. If we do not, but rather continue to view
group-oriented social issues as civil rights issues and to pursue color-
conscious solutions, my prediction is that-as benign as the intent may
be-we will advance no closer to a realization of the dream of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., and, indeed, could well find ourselves in 1996 in a ra-
cially ordered society similar to that approved by the Plessy Court in
1896.
I leave you with that to ponder.
27. Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 775, 809-10 (1979).
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